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Abstract—The increasing popular interest in personal teleme-
try, also called the Quantified Self or “lifelogging”, has induced
a popularity surge for wearable personal fitness trackers. Fitness
trackers automatically collect sensor data about the user through-
out the day, and integrate it into social network accounts. Solution
providers have to strike a balance between many constraints,
leading to a design process that often puts security in the back
seat. Case in point, we reverse engineered and identified security
vulnerabilities in Fitbit Ultra and Gammon Forerunner 610, two
popular and representative fitness tracker products. We introduce
FitBite and GarMax, tools to launch efficient attacks against
Fitbit and Garmin.
We devise SensCrypt, a protocol for secure data storage and
communication, for use by makers of affordable and lightweight
personal trackers. SensCrypt thwarts not only the attacks we
introduced, but also defends against powerful JTAG Read at-
tacks. We have built Sens.io, an Arduino Uno based tracker
platform, of similar capabilities but at a fraction of the cost of
current solutions. On Sens.io, SensCrypt imposes a negligible
write overhead and significantly reduces the end-to-end sync
overhead of Fitbit and Garmin.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wearable personal trackers that collect sensor data about the
wearer, have long been used for patient monitoring in health
care. Holter Monitors [1], with large and heavy enclosures, that
use tapes for recording, have recently evolved into affordable
personal fitness trackers (e.g., [2]). Recently, popular health
centric social sensor networks have emerged. Products like
Fitbit [3], Garmin Forerunner[4] and Jawbone Up [5] require
users to carry wireless trackers that continuously record a
wide range of fitness and health parameters (e.g., steps count,
heart rate, sleep conditions), tagged with temporal and spatial
coordinates. Trackers report recorded data to a providing
server, through a specialized wireless base, that connects to
the user’s personal computer (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)). The
services that support these trackers enable users to analyze
their fitness trends with maps and charts, and share them with
friends in their social networks.
All happening too quickly both for vendors and users alike,
this data-centric lifestyle, popularly referred to as the Quanti-
fied Self or “lifelogging” is now producing massive amounts
of intimate personal data. For instance, BodyMedia [6] has
created one of the world’s largest libraries of raw and real-
world human sensor data, with 500 trillion data points [7]. This
data is becoming the source of privacy and security concerns:
information about locations and times of user fitness activities
can be used to infer surprising information, including the times
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. System components: (a) Fitbit: trackers (one cradled on the base), the
base (arrow indicated), and a user laptop. The arrow pointing to the tracker
shows the switch button, allowing the user to display various fitness data. (b)
Garmin: trackers (the watch), the base(arrow indicated), and a user laptop.
when the user is not at home [8], and company organizational
profiles [9].
We demonstrate vulnerabilities in the storage and transmis-
sion of personal fitness data in popular trackers from Fitbit [3]
and Garmin [4]. Vulnerabilities have been identified for similar
systems, including pacemakers (e.g., Halperin et al. [10])
and glucose monitoring and insulin delivery systems (e.g., Li
et. al. [11]). The differences in the system architecture and
communication model of social sensor networks enable us to
identify and exploit different vulnerabilities.
We have built two attack tools, FitBite and GarMax, and
show how they inspect and inject data into nearby Fitbit Ultra
and Garmin Forerunner trackers. The attacks are fast, thus
practical even during brief encounters. We believe that, the
vulnerabilities that we identified in the security of Fitbit and
Garmin are due to the many constraints faced by solution
providers, including time to release, cost of hardware, battery
life, features, mobility, usability, and utility to end user.
Unfortunately, such a constrained design process often puts
security in the back seat.
To help address these constraints, in this paper we introduce
SensCrypt, a protocol for secure fitness data storage and
transmission on lightweight personal trackers. We leverage
the unique system model of social sensor networks to encode
data stored on trackers using two pseudo-random values, one
generated on the tracker and one on the providing server. This
enables SensCrypt, unlike previous work [10], [12], to protect
not only against inspect and inject attacks, but also against
attackers that physically capture and read the memory of
trackers. SensCrypt’s hardware and computation requirements
are minimal, just enough to perform low-cost symmetric key
encryption and cryptographic hashes. SensCrypt does not
impose storage overhead on trackers and ensures an even wear
of the tracker storage, extending the life of flash memories with
limited program/erase cycles.
2SensCrypt is related to Dabinder (Naveed et al. [13]), an
Android level defense. Dabinder generates and enforces secure
bonding policies between a device and its official app, to
prevent external device mis-bonding attacks for Bluetooth
enabled Android health/medical devices. SensCrypt is built
for a different platform and also, unlike Dabinder, minimizes
the role played by the base.
SensCrypt is applicable to a range of sensor based plat-
forms, that includes a large number of popular fitness [3], [4],
[5], [14], [15] and home monitoring solutions [16], [17], [18],
as well as scenarios where the sensors need to be immobile
and operable without network connectivity (e.g., infrastructure,
traffic, building and campus monitoring solutions). In the
latter case, the bases through which the sensors sync with
the webserver are mobile, e.g., smartphones of workers, who
may become proximal to the sensors with the intention of data
collection or as a byproduct of routine operations.
We have developed Sens.io, a $52 tracker platform built on
Arduino Uno, of similar capabilities with current solutions.
On Sens.io, SensCrypt (i) imposes a 6ms overhead on tracker
writes, (ii) reduces the end-to-end overhead of data uploads
to 50% of that of Fitbit, and (iii) enables a server to support
large volumes of tracker communications. In conclusion, the
contributions of this paper are the following:
• Reverse engineer the semantics of the Fitbit Ultra
and Garmin Forerunner communication protocol. [Sec-
tion II-C].
• Build FitBite and GarMax, tools that exploit vulnerabil-
ities in the design of Fitbit and Garmin to implement
several attacks in a timely manner [Section III].
• Devise SensCrypt, a secure solution that imposes no
storage overhead on trackers and requires only compu-
tationally cheap operations. [Section IV] Show that Sen-
sCrypt protects even against invasive attackers, capable
of reading the memory of captured trackers [Section V].
• Implement Sens.io, a tracker platform, of similar capabil-
ities with existing popular solutions but at a fraction of
the cost [Section VII]. Show that SensCrypt running on
Sens.io is very efficient [Section VIII]
While SensCrypt’s defenses may not be immediately
adopted by existing products 1, this paper provides a founda-
tion upon which to create, implement and test new defensive
mechanisms for future tracker designs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, ATTACKER AND BACKGROUND
A. System Model
We consider a general system consisting of tracker devices,
base stations and an online social network. We exemplify the
model components using Fitbit Ultra [3] and Garmin Forerun-
ner [4], two popular health centric social sensor networks (see
Figures 1(a) and 1(b)). For simplicity, we will use “Fitbit”
to refer the Fitbit Ultra and “Garmin” to denote the Garmin
Forerunner 610 solution.
1We have contacted Fitbit and Garmin with our results. While interested in
the security of their users, they have declined collaboration.
The tracker. The tracker is a wearable device that records,
stores and reports a variety of user fitness related metrics. We
focus on the following trackers:
• The Fitbit tracker measures the daily steps taken,
distance traveled, floors climbed, calories burned, the
duration and intensity of the user exercise, and sleep
patterns. It consists of four IC chips, (i) a MMA7341L
3-axis MEMS accelerometer, (ii) a MEMS altimeter to
count the number of floors climbed and (iii) a MSP
430F2618 low power TI MCU consisting of 92 KB of
flash and 96 KB of RAM. The user can switch between
displaying different real-time fitness information on the
tracker, using a dedicated hardware switch button (see the
arrow pointing to the switch in Figure 1(a)).
• The Garmin tracker records data at user set periodic
intervals (1-9 seconds). The data includes a timestamp,
exercise type, average speed, distance traveled, altitude,
start and end position, heart rate and calories burned
during the past interval. The tracker has a heart rate
monitor (optional) and a 12 channel GPS receiver with a
built-in SiRFstarIII antenna. that enables the user to tag
activities with spatial coordinates.
Both Fitbit and Garmin trackers have chips supporting the
ANT protocol, with a 15ft transmission range for Fitbit and
33ft for Garmin. Each tracker has a unique id, called the
tracker public id (TPI). Trackers also store profile informa-
tion of their users, including age, gender and physiological
information such as height, weight and gait information.
The base and agent module. The base connects with the
user’s main computing center (e.g., PC, laptop) and with
trackers within transmission range (15ft for Fitbit and 33ft
for Forerunner) over the ANT protocol. The user needs to
install an “agent module”, a software provided by the service
provider (Fitbit, Garmin) to run on the base. The agent and
base act as a bridge between the tracker and the online social
network. They upload information stored on the tracker to its
user account on the webserver, see Figures 1(a) and 1(b) for
system snapshots.
Tracker to base pairing. Fitbit trackers communicate to any
base in their vicinity. However, tracker solutions like Garmin
Forerunners allow trackers to communicate only through bases
to which they have been previously “paired” or “bonded”.
Garmin’s pairing procedure works in the following manner.
The agent running on the base searches for available ANT
enable devices. Each tracker periodically sends broadcast
beacons over the ANT interface. If the agent discovers a
tracker, it extracts its unique id (TPI). The agent uses one of
two methods of authentication: initial pairing or passkey. The
agent verifies if it already stores an authfile for this TPI. If no
such file exists (i.e., this is the first time the tracker is pairing
with the base), the agent uses the pairing method and sends a
bind request to the tracker. When prompted, the user needs to
authenticate the operation, through the push of a button on the
tracker. The agent then retrieves a factory embedded “passkey”
from the tracker. It then stores the pair 〈TPI, passkey〉 in
a newly created authfile. During subsequent authentications,
the agent uses the passkey method: it recovers the passkey
corresponding to the TPI from the authfile and uses it to
3authenticate the tracker.
The system model considered can be extended to cover the
case of fitness tracking solutions that turn the user’s mobile
device into a base, e.g., [5], [19], [15]. In such systems,
the agent module is a mobile app running on the mobile
device. The tracker communicates with the smartphone over
existing network interfaces, e.g., Bluetooth or NFC. We note
that Naveed et al. [13] identified an intriguing vulnerabil-
ity of Android smartphones bonded to health trackers. The
vulnerability stems from the fact that the bonding occurs at
smartphone device level not at the app level. This effectively
leaves the health data vulnerable to rogue apps with Bluetooth
permissions.
The webserver. The online social network webserver (e.g., fit-
bit.com, connect.garmin.com), allows users to create accounts
from which they befriend and maintain contact with other
users. Upon purchase of a tracker and base, the user binds
the tracker to her social network account. Each social network
account has a unique id, called the user public id (UPI). When
the base detects and sets up a connection with a nearby tracker,
it automatically collects and reports tracker stored information
(step count, distance, calories, sleep patterns) with temporal
and spatial tags, to the corresponding user’s social network
account. In the following, we use the term webserver to denote
the computing resources of the online social network.
Tracker-to-base communication: the ANT protocol. Track-
ers communicate to bases over ANT, a 2.4 GHz bidirectional
wireless Personal Area Network (PAN) ultra-low power con-
sumption communication technology, optimized for transfer-
ring low-data rate, low-latency data.
Data conversion. The Fitbit tracker relies on the user’s walk
and run stride length values to convert the step count into
the distance covered. It then extrapolates the user’s Basal
Metabolic Rate (BMR) [20] values and uses them to convert
the user’s daily activities into burned calories values. The
Garmin tracker uses the GPS receiver to compute the outdoor
distance covered by the user. It then relies on the Firstbeat[21]
algorithm to convert user data (gender, height, weight, fitness
class) and the captured heart rate information to estimate the
user’s Metabolic Equivalent (MET), which in turn is used to
retrieve the calories burnt.
B. Attacker Model
We assume that the webserver is honest, and is trusted by
all participants. We assume adversaries that are able to launch
the following types of attacks:
Inspect attacks. The adversary listens on the communications
of trackers, bases and the webserver.
Inject attacks. The adversary exploits solution vulnerabilities
to modify and inject messages into the system, as well as to
jam existing communications.
Capture attacks. The adversary is able to acquire trackers
or bases of victims. The adversary can subject the captured
hardware to a variety of other attacks (e.g., Inspect and Inject)
but cannot access the memory of the hardware. We assume that
in addition to captured devices, the adversary can control any
number of trackers and bases (e.g., by purchasing them).
JTAG attacks. JTAG and boundary scan based attacks
(e.g., [22]), extend the Capture attack with the ability to access
the memory of captured devices. We focus here on “JTAG-
Read” (JTAG-R) attacks, where the attacker reads the content
of the entire tracker memory.
C. Reverse Engineering Fitbit and Garmin
Our goal in reverse-engineering the Fitbit Ultra and Garmin
Forerunner protocols was dual, (i) to understand the source(s)
of vulnerabilities and (ii) to develop security solutions that are
interoperable with these protocols. Sec. 103(f) of the DMCA
(17 U.S.C. 1201 (f)) [23] states that a person who is in legal
possession of a program, is permitted to reverse-engineer and
circumvent its protection if this is necessary in order to achieve
“interoperability”.
To log communications between trackers and webservers,
we wrote USB based filter drivers and ran them on a base.
We have used Wireshark to capture all wireless traffic between
the agent software and the webserver. To reverse engineer
Fitbit, we exploited (i) the lack of encryption in all its
communications and (ii) libfitbit [24], a library built on ANT-
FS [25] for accessing and transferring data from Fitbit trackers.
Unlike Fitbit, Garmin uses HTTPS with TLS v1.1 to send
user login credentials. However, similar to Fitbit, all other
communications are sent over plaintext HTTP.
Fitbit and Garmin bases both use service logs, files that
store information concerning communications involving the
base. Garmin’s logs consist of an “authfile” for each tracker
that was paired with the base, and .FIT files. The authfile con-
tains authentication information for each tracker. Forerunner
maintains 20 types of .FIT files, each storing a different type
of tracker data, including information about user activities,
schedules, locations and blood pressure readings. On the Win-
dows installation of the Fitbit software, daily logs are stored
in cleartext in files whose names record the hour, minute and
second corresponding to the time of the first log occurrence.
Each request and response involving the tracker, base and
social network is logged and sometimes even documented in
the archive folder of that log directory.
In the following, we first focus on Fitbit’s tracker memory
organization and communication protocol.
Fitbit: Tracker memory organization. A tracker has both
read banks, containing data to be read by the base and write
banks, containing data that can be written by the base. The
read banks store the daily user fitness records. The write
banks store user information specified in the “Device Settings”
and “Profile Settings” fields of the user’s Fitbit account. The
tracker commits sensor values (step, floor count) to the read
bank once per minute. The tracker can store 7 days worth of
1-per-minute sensor readings [26].
The webserver communicates with the tracker through XML
blocks, that contain base64 encoded commands, or opcodes.
tracker. Opcodes are 7 bytes long. We briefly list below the
most important opcodes and their corresponding responses.
The opcode types are also shown in Figure 2.
• Retrieve device information (TRQ-REQ): opcode
[0x24,000000]. Upon receiving this opcode from the
4Fig. 2. Fitbit Upload protocol. Enables the tracker to upload its collected
sensor data to the user’s social networking account on the webserver. Sen-
sCrypt’s Upload protocol extends this protocol, see Section IV.
webserver (via the base), the tracker sends a reply that
contains its serial number (5 bytes), the hardware revision
number, and whether the tracker is plugged in on the base.
• Read/write tracker memory (READ-TRQ/WRITE).
To read a memory bank, the webserver needs to issue the
READ-TRQ opcode, [0x22, index,00000], where index
denotes the memory bank requested. The response em-
beds the content of the specified memory bank. To write
data to a memory bank, the webserver issues the WRITE
opcode [0x23, index, datalen,0000]. The payload data
is sent along with the opcode. The value index denotes
the destination memory bank and datalen is the length of
the payload. A successful operation returns the response
[0x41,000000].
• Erase memory: (ERASE) opcode [0x25, index, t, 0].
The webserver specifies the index denoting the memory
bank to be erased. The value t (4 bytes, MSB) denotes the
operation deadline - the date until which the data should
be erased. A successful operation returns the response
[0x41,000000].
Fitbit: The communication protocol. The communication
between the webserver and the tracker through the base, is em-
bedded in XML blocks, that contain base64 encoded opcodes:
commands for the tracker. All opcodes are 7 bytes long and
vary according to the instruction type (e.g., TRQ-REQ, READ-
TRQ, WRITE, ERASE, CLEAR). The system data flow during
the data upload operation is shown in Figure 2.
1) Upon receiving a beacon from the tracker, the base
establishes a connection with the tracker.
2) Phase 1: The base contacts the webserver at the URL
HOME/device/tracker/uploadData and sends basic client
and platform information.
3) Phase 2: The webserver sends the tracker id and the
opcode for retrieving tracker information (TRQ-REQ).
4) The base contacts the specified tracker, retrieves its infor-
mation TRQ-INFO (serial number, firmware version, etc.)
and sends it to the webserver at HOME/device/tracker/
dumpData/lookupTracker.
5) Phase 3: Given the tracker’s serial number, the webserver
retrieves the associated tracker public id (TPI) and user
public id (UPI) values. The webserver sends to the base
the TPI/UPI values along with the opcodes for retrieving
fitness data from the tracker (READ-TRQ).
6) The base forwards the TPI and UPI values and the
opcodes to the tracker, retrieves the fitness data from the
tracker (TRQ-DATA) and sends it to the webserver at
HOME/device/tracker/dumpData/dumpData.
7) Phase 4: The webserver sends to the base, opcodes
to WRITE updates provided by the user in her Fitbit
social network account (device and profile settings, e.g.,
body and personal information, time zone, etc). The base
forwards the WRITE opcode and the updates to the
tracker, which overwrites the previous values on its write
memory banks.
8) The webserver sends opcodes to ERASE the fitness
data from the tracker. The base forwards the ERASE
request to the tracker, who then erases the contents of
the corresponding read memory banks.
9) The base forwards the response codes from the tracker
to the webserver at the address
HOME/device/tracker/dumpData/
clearDataConfigTracker.
10) The webserver replies to the base with the opcode to
CLOSE the tracker.
11) The base requests the tracker to SLEEP for 15 minutes,
before sending its next beacon.
D. Crypto Tools
We use a symmetric key encryption system. We write
EK(M) to denote the encryption of a messageM with keyK .
We also use cryptographic hashes that are pre-image, second
pre-image and collision resistant. We use H(M) to denote
the hash of message M . We also use hash based message
authentication codes [27]: we write Hmac(K,M) to denote
the authentication code of message M with key K .
III. FITBIT AND GARMIN ATTACKS
During the reverse engineering process, we discovered
several fundamental vulnerabilities, which we describe here.
We then detail the attacks we have deployed to exploit these
vulnerabilities, and their results.
A. Vulnerabilities
Fitbit: cleartext login information. During the initial user
login via the Fitbit client software, user passwords are passed
to the webserver in cleartext and then stored in log files on
the base. Figure 3 shows a snippet of captured data, with the
cleartext authentication credentials emphasized. Garmin uses
encryption only during the login step.
5Fig. 3. Fitbit service logs: Proof of login credentials sent in cleartext in a
HTTP POST request sent from the base to the webserver.
Fitbit and Garmin: cleartext HTTP data processing. For
both Fitbit and Garmin, the tracker’s data upload opera-
tion uses no encryption or authentication. All the tracker-to-
webserver communications take place in cleartext.
Garmin: faulty authentication during Pairing. The authen-
tication in the Pairing procedure of Garmin assumes that the
base follows the protocol and has not been compromised by an
attacker. The authentication process is not mutual: the tracker
does not authenticate the base.
B. The FitBite and GarMax Tools
We have built FitBite and GarMax, tools that exploit the
above vulnerabilities to attack Fitbit Ultra and Garmin Fore-
runner. FitBite and GarMax consist of separate modules for (i)
discovering and binding to a nearby tracker, (ii) retrieving data
from a nearby tracker, (iii) injecting data into a nearby tracker
and (iv) injecting data into the social networking account of a
tracker owner. We have built FitBite and GarMax over ANT-
FS, in order to connect to and issue (ANT-FS) commands to
nearby trackers. The attacker needs to run FitBite or GarMax
on a base he controls.
The time required to search and bind to a nearby tracker
varies significantly, but is normally in the range of 3-20
seconds. On average, the time to query a tracker is 12-15s.
More detailed timing information is presented for the attacks
presented in the following. We conclude that these attacks can
be performed even during brief encounters with victim tracker
owners.
C. Attacks and Results
Tracker Private Data Capture (TPDC). FitBite discovers
tracker devices within transmission range and captures their
Type of data FitBite GarMax
Device info ✓ ✓
User profile, schedules, goals ✓ ✓
Fitness data ✓ ✓
(GPS) Location history ✗ ✓
TABLE I
TYPES OF DATA HARVESTED BY FITBITE AND GARMAX FROM FITBIT
AND GARMIN. GARMIN PROVIDES GPS TAGGED FITNESS INFORMATION,
WHICH GARMAX IS ABLE TO COLLECT.
fitness information: Fitbit performs no authentication during
tracker data uploads. We exploit Garmin’s assumption of an
honest base to use GarMax, running on a corrupt base, to
capture data from nearby trackers. We show how GarMax
binds a “rogue” base agent to Garmin trackers of strangers
within a radius of 33ft. GarMax exploits the authentication vul-
nerability of Garmin’s Pairing procedure (see Section III-A).
During the tracker authentication and passkey retrieval step
of the Pairing procedure (see Section II-C), GarMax running
on an attacker controlled base, retrieves the TPI of the nearby
victim tracker. It then creates a directory with the TPI name
and creates an auth file with a random, 8 byte long passkey.
GarMax verifies the tracker’s serial number and other ANT
parameters, then reads the passkey from the auth file. Instead
of running the passkey authentication method, GarMax directly
downloads fitness information (to be stored in .FIT files) from
the tracker. This is possible since the tracker assumes the base
has not been corrupted, and thus does not authenticate it.
TPDC can be launched in public spaces, particularly those
frequented by fitness users (e.g., parks, sports venues, etc)
and takes less than 13s on average. It is particularly damaging
as trackers store sensor readings (i) with high frequency (1-
9 seconds for Garmin, 1 minute for Fitbit), and (ii) for long
intervals: up to 7 days of fitness data history for Fitbit and
up to 1000 laps and 100 favorite locations for Garmin. The
data captured contains sensitive user profile information and
fitness information. For Garmin this information is tagged with
GPS locations. Table I summarizes the information captured
by FitBite and GarMax.
Figure 4 shows the reconstructed exercise circuit of a victim,
with data we recovered from a TPDC attack on Garmin. The
GPS location history can be used to infer the user’s home,
locations of interest, exercise and travel patterns.
Tracker Injection (TI) Attack. FitBite and GarMax use the
reverse engineered knowledge of the communication packet
format, opcode instructions and memory banks, to modify
and inject fitness data on neighboring trackers. On average,
this attack takes less than 18s, for both FitBite and GarMax.
Figure 5 shows a sample outcome of the TI attack on a victim
Fitbit tracker, displaying an unreasonable value for the (daily)
number of steps taken by its user.
User Account Injection (UAI) Attack. We used FitBite
and GarMax to report fabricated fitness information into our
social networking accounts. We have successfully injected
unreasonable daily step counts, e.g., 12.58 million in Fitbit,
see Figure 6. Fitbit did not report any inconsistency, especially
as the corresponding distance we reported was 0.02 miles! The
UAI attack takes only 6s on average.
Similarly, GarMax fabricates an activity file embedding
the attacker provided fitness data in FIT/TCX [29] format.
The simplest approach is to copy an existing activity file
of the same or another user (made publicly available in the
Garmin Connect website) and modify device and user specific
information. We have used GarMax to successfully inject
“running” activities of 1000 miles each, the largest permissible
value, while keeping the other parameters intact.
Free Badges and Financial Rewards. By successful injection
of large values in their social networking accounts, FitBite
6Fig. 4. TPDC outcome on Garmin: the attacker retrieves the user’s exercise circuit on a map (shown in red on the right side), based on individual fitness
data records (shown on the left in XML format). The data record on the left includes both GPS coordinates, heart rate, speed and cadence.
Fig. 5. Outcome of Tracker Injection (TI) attack on Fitbit tracker: The daily
step count is unreasonably high (167,116 steps).
Fig. 6. Snapshot of Fitbit user account data injection attack. In addition to
earning undeserved badges (e.g., the “Top Daily Step”), it enables insiders to
accumulate points and receive financial rewards through sites like Earndit [28].
and GarMax enable insiders to achieve special milestones
and acquire merit badges, without doing the required work.
Figure 6 shows how in Fitbit, the injected value of 12.58
million steps, being greater than 40,000, enables the account
owner to acquire a “Top Daily Step” badge. Furthermore,
by injecting fraudulent fitness information into Earndit [28],
an associated site, we were able to accumulate undeserved
rewards, including 200 Earndit points, redeemable for a $20
gift card.
Battery Drain Attack. FitBite allows the attacker to contin-
uously query trackers in her vicinity, thus drain their batteries
at a faster rate. To understand the efficiency of this attack, we
have experimented with 3 operation modes. First, the daily
upload mode, where the tracker syncs with the USB base and
the Fitbit account once per day. Second, the 15 mins upload
mode, where the tracker is kept within 15 ft. from the base,
thus allowing it to be queried once every 15 minutes. Finally,
Fig. 7. Battery drain for three operation modes. The attack mode drains the
battery around 21 times faster than the 1 day upload mode and 5.63 times
faster than the 15 mins upload mode.
the attack mode, where FitBite’s TM module continuously (an
average of 4 times a minute) queries the victim tracker. To
avoid detection, the BM module uploads tracker data into the
webserver only once every 15 minutes. Figure 7 shows our
battery experiment results for the three modes: FitBite drains
the tracker battery around 21 times faster than the 1 day upload
mode and 5.63 times faster than the 15 mins upload mode.
In the daily upload mode, the battery lasted for 29 days. In
the 15 mins upload mode, the battery lasted for 186.38 hours
(7 days and 18 hours). In the attack mode, the battery lasted
for a total of 32.71 hours. While this attack is not fast enough
to impact trackers targeted by casual attackers, it shows that
FitBite drains the tracker battery around 21 times faster than
the 1 day upload mode and 5.63 times faster than the 15 mins
upload mode.
Denial of Service. FitBite’s injection attack can be used to
prevent Fitbit users from correctly updating their real-time
statistics. The storage capacity of the Garmin tracker is limited
to 1000 laps. Thus, an attacker able to injects a number of
fake laps exceeding the 1000 limit, can prevent the tracker
from recording the user’s valid data. A Fitbit tracker can
display up to 6 digit values. When the injected value exceeds
6 digits, the least significant digits can not be displayed on the
tracker. This prevents the user from keeping track of her daily
performance evolution. In addition, for both Fitbit and Garmin,
the attacker can render part of the recorded data useless, by
injecting incorrect user profile information. For instance, by
modifying user profile information (e.g., height, weight, see
Section II-A), the attacker corrupts information built based on
7it, e.g., “calories burnt”.
IV. A PROTOCOL FOR LIGHTWEIGHT SECURITY
A. Solution Requirements
We aim to develop a solution for low power fitness trackers
that satisfies the following requirements:
1) Security. Defend against the attacks described in Sec-
tion II-B.
2) Minimal tracker overhead. Minimize the computation
and storage overheads imposed on the resource con-
strained trackers.
3) Flexible upload. Allow trackers to securely upload sen-
sor information through multiple bases.
4) User friendly. Minimize user interaction.
5) Level tracker memory wear. Extend memory lifetime
by leveling the wear of its blocks.
B. Public Key Cryptography: A No Go
We propose first FitCrypt, a solution to explore the feasibil-
ity of public key cryptosystems to efficiently secure the storage
and communications of trackers. In FitCrypt, each tracker
stores a public key. The corresponding private key is only
known by the webserver. Each sensor data record is encrypted
with the public key before being stored on the tracker. RSA
with a 2048 bit key imposes a 4-hold storage overhead on
Fitbit (each record of 64B is converted into a 256B record)
and a 3.2-hold overhead on Garmin. We also consider ECIES
(Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme), an elliptic
curve crypto (ECC) solution that uses a 224 bit key size, the
security equivalent of RSA with 2048 bit modulus. ECIES
imposes a storage overhead of 224 + 3r bits, where r = 112
is the size of a security parameter. Thus, the storage overhead
is 165% for Fitbit and 150% for Garmin).
When run on an Arduino Uno board, FitCrypt-RSA takes
2.3s and FitCrypt-ECC takes 2.5s to encode a single sensor
record (see Table V, Section VIII). Garmin records sensor data
with a frequency as high as one write per second. FitCrypt
imposes a 250% overhead on the sensor recording task (of 2.5s
every 1s interval), thus does not satisfy the second requirement
of Section IV-A. To address this issue, in the following we
introduce SensCrypt, a lightweight and secure solution for
wearable trackers.
C. SensCrypt
We introduce SensCrypt, a lightweight protocol for provid-
ing secure data storage and communication in fitness centric
social sensor networks.
Protocol overview. Let U denote a user, T denote her tracker,
B a base and W the webserver. T ’s memory is divided into
records, each storing one snapshot of sensor data. The memory
is organized using a circular buffer structure, to ensure an even
wear. T shares a symmetric keyKT withW .W also maintains
a unique secret key KW for each tracker T .
To prevent Inject attacks, all communications between T
andW are authenticated with KT . To prevent Inspect, Capture
and JTAG-R attacks, we encode each tracker record using two
Notation Definition
U , T , B, W user, tracker, base and webserver
idU , idT , idB unique identifiers of U , T and B
dirty pointer to first written record
clean pointer to first available record
start, end pointers to memory bounds
KW symmetric key maintained by W for T
KT symmetric key shared by W and T
ctr counter shared by W and T
Map data base of W for users and trackers
mem memory of a tracker
TABLE II
SYMBOL DEFINITIONS.
Fig. 8. Example SensCrypt tracker memory (mem). Light green denotes
“clean”, unwritten areas. Red denotes areas that encode tracker sensor data.
(a) After (i-1) records have been written. The ctr is 1. (b) After Upload
occurs at the state in (a). The ctr becomes 2, to enable the creation of fresh
PRNs, overwritten on the former red area. (c) After n− i+ 2 more records
have been written from state (b), leading to the clean pointer cycling over
from the start of the memory. (d) After Upload occurs at the state in (c).
pseudo-random numbers (PRNs). One PRN is generated by
W using KW and written on T during data sync protocols.
The other PRN is generated by T using KT at the time when
the record is written on its memory. Both PRNs can later
be reconstructed by W . This approach significantly increases
the complexity of an attack: the attacker needs to capture the
encoded data and both PRNs to recover the cleartext data.
D. The SensCrypt Protocol
Let idU , idB , and idT denote the public unique identities
of U , B, and T . U has an account with W . W manages a
database Map that has an entry for each user and tracker pair:
Map[idU , idT ] = [idU , idT , KT , KW , ctr]. Each tracker is
factory initialized with a symmetric key KT and a counter ctr
initialized to 1. KT and ctr are also stored in Map[idU , idT ].
KW is a per-tracker symmetric key, kept secret by W . Table II
summarizes these symbols for easy access.
SensCrypt consists of 2 procedures, RecordData and
Upload. RecordData is invoked by T to record new sensor
data; Upload allows it to sync its data with W . We now
describe the organization of the tracker memory.
Tracker Memory Organization. Let mem denote the mem-
ory of T . mem is divided in “records” of fixed length (e.g.,
864 bytes for Fitbit, 80 bytes for Garmin). Each record stores
one report from the tracker’s sensors (see Section II-A). We
organize time into fixed length “epochs” (e.g., 2s long for
Fitbit, 1-9s long for Garmin). RecordData records sensor
data once per epoch. mem is organized using a circular buffer.
The dirty pointer is to the location of the first written record,
and the clean pointer is to the location of the first record
available for writing. When reaching the end of mem, both
records “circle” over to the start pointer. Figure 8 illustrates
the SensCrypt tracker storage organization, after the execution
of various RecordData and Upload procedures. Algorithm 1
shows the pseudo-code of the procedures.
During Upload, each previously written tracker record is
reset by W to store a pseudo-random value (line 18 and
lines 21-29 of Algorithm 1). That is, the i-th record of the
tracker’s memory is set to hold EKW (ctr, i), where KW is
the secret key W stores for T . The index i ensures that each
record contains a different value. ctr counts the number of
times mem has been completely overwritten; it ensures that a
memory record is overwritten with a different encrypted value.
The RecordData Procedure. Commit newly recorded sen-
sor data D to mem, in the next available record, pointed
to by clean. T generates a new pseudo-random value,
EKT (ctr, clean), and xors it into place with mem[clean] =
EKW (ctr, clean) and D (see line 10 of algorithm 1):
mem[clean] = D ⊕ EKT (ctr, clean)⊕ EKW (ctr, clean).
The clean pointer is then incremented (line 11). When reach-
ing the end of mem, clean circles back to start(lines 12,13).
We call “red” the written records and “green” the records
available for write. dirty and clean enable us to reduce the
communication overhead of Upload (see next): instead of
sending the entire mem, T sends to W only the red records.
The Upload Procedure. We present the SensCrypt Upload
as an extension of the corresponding Fitbit protocol illus-
trated in Figure 2. In the following, each message M sent
between T and W is accompanied by an authentication
value Hmac(KT ,M), where Hmac is a hash based message
authentication code [27]. The receiver of the message usesKT
to verify the authenticity of the sender and of the message. For
simplicity of exposition, in the following we omit the Hmac
value.
Upload extends steps 6b and 7 of the Fitbit Upload.
Specifically, when T receives the READ-TRQ command (step
6a), it compares the dirty and clean pointers. If dirty < clean
(see Figure 8(a)), T sends to W , through B,
T→ B→ W : TRQ− DATA, idT, mem[dirty..clean],
where mem[dirty..clean] denotes T ’s red memory area. For
each record i between dirty and clean, W uses keys KT and
KW and the current value of ctr to recover the sensor data:
D[i] = mem[i]⊕EKT (ctr, i)⊕EKW (ctr, i) (see lines 21-23
and line 16). Then, in step 7 of Upload (see Figure 2), W
sends to T :
W→ B→ T : WRITE, idT, EKT(ctr+ 1, EKW(ctr+ 1, i)),
∀i=dirty..clean. T uses KT to decrypt each EKT (ctr +
1, EKW (ctr+1, i)) value. If the first field of the result equals
Algorithm 1: Tracker memory management pseudocode.
Instructions preceded by W : are executed at the web-
server, those preceded by T : are executed at the tracker.
W → T : I denotes an instruction I issued at W and
executed at T . The entire RecordData is executed at T .
Figure 8 illustrates the pseudocode.
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1.Object implementation Memory;
2. T : mem : record[]; #tracker memory
3. T : dirty : int; #pointer to used area
4. T : clean : int; #pointer to unused area
5. T : start, end : int; #memory bounds
6. W : KW : byte[]; #key for T
7. W, T : KT : byte[]; #key shared by T, W
8. W, T : ctr : int; #counter shared by T, W
9. Operation int T : RecordData(D : sensor data)
10. mem[clean] ⊕ = D⊕ EKT(ctr, clean);
11. clean = clean+ 1;
12. if (clean == end) then;
13. clean = start; fi
14. end
15.Operation void ProcessRecord(ind : int, c : int)
16. W : D = mem[ind]⊕ EKW(c, ind)⊕ EKT(c, ind);
17. W : process(D);
18. W→ T : mem[ind] = EKW(c + 1, ind);
19. end
20.Operation void Upload()
21. if (dirty < clean) do
22. for (i = dirty; i < clean; i++) do
23. ProcessRecord(i, ctr); od
24. else if (clean < dirty) do
25. for (i = dirty; i ≤ end; i++) do
26. ProcessRecord(i, ctr); od
27. for (i = start; i < clean; i++) do
28. ProcessRecord(i, ctr+ 1); od
29. W, T : ctr = ctr+ 1; fi
30. T : dirty = clean;
31. end
ctr + 1, T overwrites mem[dirty + i] with EKW (ctr + 1, i)
(see line 18), then sets dirty=clean(line 30). Thus, mem[dirty..
clean] becomes green. The case where clean < dirty, occurring
when clean circles over, past the memory end, is handled
similarly, see lines 24-29 of Algorithm 1 and Figure 8(c) and
(d). We eliminate the ERASE communication (steps 8 and 9
in Figure 2) from the Fitbit protocol.
V. ANALYSIS
A. SensCrypt Advantages
SensCrypt ensures an even wear of tracker memory: the
most overwritten memory record has at most 2 overwrites
more than the least overwritten record. To see why this is the
case, consider that once written, a record is not overwritten
until a next Upload takes place. The circular buffer organi-
zation of the memory ensures that all the memory records
9Capabilities SensCrypt FitCrypt
Inspect TPDC, TI, UAI TPDC, TI, UAI
Inject TPDC, TI, UAI TPDC, TI, UAI
Capture TPDC, TI, UAI TPDC, TI, UAI
JTAG-R TPDC, TI, UAI TPDC, TI, UAI
JTAG-RW TPDC TPDC
JTAG-R + Inspect TI, UAI TPDC, TI, UAI
JTAG-R + Inject TI TPDC, TI
Double JTAG-R TI, UAI TPDC, TI, UAI
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF DEFENSES PROVIDED BY SENSCRYPT AND FITCRYPT
AGAINST THE TYPES OF ATTACKS DESCRIBED IN SECTION III-C WHEN
THE ADVERSARY HAS A COMBINATION OF THE CAPABILITIES DESCRIBED
IN SECTION II-B. EACH ELEMENT IN THE TABLE DESCRIBES WHICH
ATTACKS ARE THWARTED BY THE CORRESPONDING SOLUTION.
of the tracker are overwritten, not just the ones at the start
of the memory. Using the example illustrated in Figure 8(d),
notice that the first record, has been overwritten twice since
the subsequent green blocks: once with encData[1], see
Figure 8(c), and once with the new EKW (3, 1) received from
W .
By preventing excessive overwriting of records at the be-
ginning of the memory, SensCrypt extends the life of trackers.
This is particularly important for flash memories, that have a
limited number of P/E (program/erase) cycles.
SensCrypt is user friendly, as the user is not involved in
Upload and RecordData procedures. The SensCrypt base is
thin, required to only setup standard secure SSL connections to
W , and forward traffic between T and W . SensCrypt imposes
no storage overhead on trackers: sensor data is xor-ed in-place
in mem.
B. Security Discussion
Consider the life cycle of record i, Ri, on T . After
the execution of the first Upload, Ri is initialized with
EKW (ctr, i). When Ri is overwritten with sensor data, it
contains encData[i] = D[i] ⊕ EKT (ctr, i) ⊕ EKW (ctr, i).
Subsequently, Ri is not touched until an Upload takes place.
During Upload, the (encoded) content of mem[i] is sent
to W , who subsequently overwrites Ri with a new value:
EKW (ctr + 1, i).
The base does not contribute to the messages it forwards
between T and W . Hence, the base does not need to be
authenticated. The use of the ctr+1 value in communications
through the base ensures message freshness.
Without EKT (ctr, i), an Inspect adversary capturing com-
munications between T and W cannot recover mem[i]. The
use of HMACs with the key KT to authenticate communica-
tions between T andW prevents Inject attacks: an attacker that
modifies existing messages or injects new messages cannot
create valid HMAC values.
An attacker that launches a Capture attack against a victim
tracker or base, cannot recover information from them and
thus has no advantage over general Inspect and Inject attacks.
An adversary that captures a tracker T and launches a JTAG-
R attack can either read EKW (ctr, i) or D[i] ⊕ EKW (ctr, i)
⊕ EKT (ctr, i), but not both. The use of the EKT (ctr, i)
value prevents an attacker from recovering D[i]. A JTAG-
R attack against a captured, trusted base of tracker T offers
no advantage over Inspect and Inject attacks: in SensCrypt,
the base only forwards traffic between T and W . Similar to
JTAG-R, a JTAG-RW attack against a captured tracker cannot
decode previously encoded sensor data; it can however encode
fraudulent data on the tracker (TI attack) and thus also inject
data into W (UAI attack).
An adversary able to perform Inspect, Capture and JTAG-R
attacks can gain access to EKW (ctr, i) when sent by W , then
use JTAG-R to read T ’s KT , compute EKT (ctr, i) and learn
D[i] (TPDC attack). We note the complexity of this attack.
If able to further implement Inject attacks, the adversary can
also succeed in a UAI attack.
Furthermore, SensCrypt is vulnerable to an adversary able
to capture T twice, at times t1 and t2. At time t1 the adversary
uses JTAG-R to read EKW (ctr, i). At time t2, assuming T has
already written record i, the adversary uses JTAG-R to read
mem[i] and KT and recoverD[i]. This double JTAG-R attack
is significantly more complex than a single JTAG-R attack. In
addition, this attack is further complicated by time constraints:
At t1, record i has not yet been written, and at t2 it has been
written but an Upload has not yet been executed. An Upload
procedure before t2 would overwrite record i with EKW (ctr+
1, i), effectively thwarting this attack.
FitCrypt is resilient to TPDC attacks launched by adver-
saries capable of performing JTAG-R and Inspect, Inject and
double JTAG-R attacks: T ’s records encrypted with the public
key can only be decrypted by W . Table III summarizes the
comparison of SensCrypt and FitLock defenses. While pro-
viding more defenses (i.e., against TPDC for several attacker
capabilities), FitLock is not a viable solution on most of the
available trackers (see Section VIII).
VI. APPLICATIONS
SensCrypt can be applied to a range of sensor based
platforms, where resource constrained sensors are unable to
directly sync their data with a central webserver and need
to use an Internet connected base. This includes a large
number of popular fitness and home monitoring solutions.
Table IV summarizes several such platforms, including the
communication and storage capabilities of their sensors.
SensCrypt can also be used in applications where the sen-
sors need to be immobile, while being able to operate without
network connectivity. Examples include health, infrastructure,
traffic, building and campus monitoring solutions. The bases
through which the sensors sync with the webserver are mobile,
e.g., smartphones of workers, who may become proximal
to the sensors with the intention of data collection or as a
byproduct of routine operations.
SensCrypt can also secure the data and communications of
platforms for social psychological studies. One such example
is SociableSense [30], a smartphone solution that captures
sensitive user behaviors (including co-location), processes the
information on a remote server, and provides measures of user
sociability.
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Platform Type of data Communication Coverage Memory
Fitbit [3] user profile, fitness, sleep data ANT+, BT 5-50m 96 KB RAM, 112 KB flash
Garmin FR610 [4] fitness data, heart rate, location ANT+ 10-20m 1 MB
Nike+ [19] profile, fitness data BT 50m Flash 256KB, RAM 32 KB
Jawbone Up [5] fitness, sleep data BT 50m 128KB Flash, 8KB RAM
Motorola MotoActv [14] fitness data, user profile ANT+, BT, Wi-Fi 35m 16 GB
Basis B1 [15] fitness, sleep data, heart rate BT 50m 7 days of data
Mother [18] motion, fitness, proximity 915-MHz 30m 32 KB RAM
Nest [16] utility data Wi-Fi 35m 512Mb DRAM, 2 Gb flash
Belkin WeMo [17] home electronics Wi-Fi 35m RAM 32 MB, Flash 16 MB
TABLE IV
SENSCRYPT APPLICABILITY: FITNESS TRACKERS, HOME MONITORING SOLUTIONS.
Fig. 9. Testbed for SensCrypt. Sens.io is the Arduino Uno device equipped
with Bluetooth shield and SD card is the tracker. Nexus 4 is the base.
VII. SENS.IO: THE PLATFORM
We have built Sens.io, a prototype tracker, from off-the-
shelves components. It consists of an Arduino Uno Rev3 [31]
and external Bluetooth (Seeeduino V3.0) and SanDisk card
shields. The Arduino platform is a good model of resource
constrained trackers: its ATmega328 micro-controller has a
16MHz clock, 32 KB Flash memory, 2 KB SRAM and
1KB EEPROM. The Bluetooth card has a default baud rate
of 38,400 and communication range up to 10m. Since the
Arduino has 2 KB SRAM, it can only rely on 1822 bytes to
buffer data for transmissions. The SD card (FAT 16) can be
accessed at the granularity of 512 byte blocks.
The cost of Sens.io is $52 ($25 Arduino card, $20 Bluetooth
shield, $2.5 SD Card shield, $4 SD card, see Figure 9), a
fraction of Fitbit’s ($99) and Garmin’s ($299) trackers.
SensCrypt. We have implemented a general, end-to-end Sen-
sCrypt architecture, as illustrated in Figure 10. We have imple-
mented the tracker both in Arduino’s programming language (a
Wiring implementation [32]), and, for generality, in Android.
The base component (written exclusively in Android) is a
simple communication relay. We implemented the webserver
using Apache Tomcat 7.0.52 and Apache Axis2 Web services
engine. We used the MongoDB 2.4.9 database to store the
Map structure. We implemented a Bluetooth [33] serial com-
munication protocol between the tracker and the base.
The testbed. We used Sens.io for the tracker, an Android
Nexus 4 with 1.512 GHz CPU for the base, and a 2.4GHz Intel
Fig. 10. SensCrypt architecture. The tracker relies on locally stored key KT
to authenticate webserver messages and encode sensor data. The webserver
manages the Map structure, to authenticate and decrypt tracker reports.
Platform SensCrypt FitCr-RSA FitCr-ECC
Fitbit 6.02 2300 2520
Garmin 6.06 2300 2520
TABLE V
RECORDDATA: COMPUTATION OVERHEAD IN MS. FITCRYPT-RSA 2048
BIT IS NOT VIABLE ON ARDUINO (2.3S). FITCRYPT-ECC 224 BIT
(EQUIVALENT OF RSA 2048 BIT) IS EVEN LESS EFFICIENT. SENSCRYPT IS
2-3 ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE MORE EFFICIENT.
Core i5 Dell laptop with 4GB of RAM for the webserver. We
used Bluetooth for tracker to base communications and Wi-
Fi for the connectivity between the base and the webserver.
Figure 9 illustrates our testbed.
VIII. EVALUATION
We used Sens.io for the tracker, Android Nexus 4 with 1.512
GHz CPU for the base, and a 2.4GHz Intel Core i5 Dell laptop
with 4GB of RAM for the webserver. We used Bluetooth for
tracker to base communications and Wi-Fi for the connectivity
between the base and the webserver. Figure 9 illustrates our
testbed.
In the following, we report evaluation results, as averages
taken over at least 10 independent protocol runs.
A. Tracker: RecordData Overhead
We have investigated the overhead of the RecordData
procedure on Sens.io. Table V compares the performance of
SensCrypt and FitCrypt, with times shown in milliseconds.
We have explored two versions of FitCrypt, using RSA and
ECC. FitCrypt-RSA with a 1024 bit modulus takes more than
11
500ms, but is currently obsolete. FitCrypt-RSA with a 2048
bit modulus hangs on Sens.io due to its low (2KB) RAM.
The value shown in Table V is from [34], where a similar
platform was used. FitCrypt-ECC uses ECIES, an elliptic
curve cryptography solution, with a 224 bit key size, the
security equivalent of RSA with 2048 bit modulus. FitCrypt-
RSA 2048 and FitCrypt-ECC are not viable alternatives,
imposing an overhead of 230% for 1 per sec. RecordData
frequency. SensCrypt imposes however an overhead of less
than 1% (6ms for each 1s interval between RecordData runs).
B. Webserver: Storage Overhead
The webserver maintains a data structure, Map, with a
record for each user and tracker pair. The entry consists of
user, tracker and bases ids (8 byte long each), a salt (16B),
password hash (28B), 2 symmetric keys (32B each) and a
counter (1B). Assuming a single base in the Bases list, a
Map entry stores 133 bytes. For a 1 million user base, the
webserver needs to store a Map structure of 127MB. The
average time to retrieve a record from a 1 million user Map
is 158ms.
C. Upload: End-to-end Overhead
We consider a “Fitbit” scenario where the Upload procedure
runs once every 15 minutes when in the vicinity of a base.
Assuming a RecordData frequency of once every 2s (usual in
Garmin), and a record size of 64B, SensCrypt uploads and
overwrites 71 blocks of 512B each. The tracker side of the
SensCrypt Upload procedure takes 502ms, dominated by the
cost to read and write 71 blocks of data from/to the SD card.
A single core of the Dell laptop can support 5 Uploads per
second. The server cost is dominated by the 158ms cost of
retrieving a record from a 1 million entry Map. The Upload/s
rate of the webserver can be improved by caching the least
recently accessed or most popular records of Map. Even
though transferring over Bluetooth, the communication cost
of SensCrypt’s Upload is 153ms. This is due to the low RAM
available on Arduino for buffering packets (2KB).
SensCrypt’s total Upload time of 845ms is 400ms less than
FitCrypt’s, assuming Fitbit’s memory size. We note however
that Fitbit records data only once per minute, a rate at which
SensCrypt would perform significantly faster. SensCrypt is
13 times faster (by more than 11s) than FitCrypt when
considering Garmin’s memory (2000 blocks of 512B). This
gain is due to SensCrypt’s optimization of only uploading the
red, written blocks, instead of the entire memory.
Furthermore, even on the communication restricted Sens.io,
SensCrypt reduces the upload operation of the real Fitbit
equipment (1481ms on average) by 43%.
D. Battery Impact
To evaluate the impact of SensCrypt on the battery life-
time, we powered the Sens.io device using a 9V alkaline
battery [35]. In a first experiment, we evaluated the ability of
SensCrypt to mitigate the effects of the battery drain attack.
For this, we used the Bluetooth enabled Sens.io device to
Solutions T W Comm
SensCrypt 502.13 190.4 153
FitCrypt (Fitbit) 904.56 177.36 162
FitCrypt (Garmin) 9366 322 1686
TABLE VI
UPLOAD: COMPARISON OF TRACKER, WEBSERVER AND COMMUNICATION
DELAYS (SHOWN IN MS) OF SENSCRYPT AND FITCRYPT. FITCRYPT (RSA
OR ECC) IS SHOWN BOTH FOR THE FITBIT (96KB) AND GARMIN (1MB)
MEMORY SIZE. THE DELAY OF SENSCRYPT IS INDEPENDENT OF mem
SIZE, AND SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTER.
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Fig. 11. Battery lifetime for 9V cell powered Sens.io device in four scenarios:
Baseline, Fitbit, SensCrypt and FitCrypt-RSA-256. The last three scenarios
record sensor data every 2s. The Baseline scenario measures the battery
lifetime of Arduino device with no functionality. SensCrypt reduces 13% of
the battery lifetime over Fitbit’s operation. Even a vulnerable FitCrypt-RSA-
256 reduces the battery lifetime to half of SensCrypt.
establish a connection with an Android app running on a
Nexus 4 base. We investigated and compared two scenarios. In
the first scenario, the Bluetooth enabled Sens.io runs the Fitbit
protocol to process and respond to requests received every 15s.
In the second scenario, the Sens.io device runs SensCrypt to
process the same requests. Each scenario is performed using
a fresh 9V battery.
When running Fitbit, the Sens.io device runs out of battery
after 484 minutes. When running SensCrypt, the Sens.io de-
vice lasts for a total of 821 minutes. Thus, SensCrypt extends
the battery lifetime of Sens.io under the battery depletion
attack by 69%.
In a second experiment, we compared the impact of the
periodic SensCrypt, FitCrypt-RSA-256 and Fitbit sensor data
recording operations on the Sens.io battery lifetime. In the
experiment, we considered a 2s interval between consecutive
sensor recording operations. We have tested several RSA key
sizes (2048 to 256 bit long). An (insecure) RSA key size
of 256 bits was the largest value that did not hang on an
Arduino board after only a few encryptions. We have also run
a baseline experiment, measuring the battery lifetime of an
Arduino board that is not recording any sensor data.
Figure 11 shows our results. In the Baseline scenario, the
battery lasted 56 hrs and 23 mins. When running Fitbit’s
sensor data record operation, the battery lasted 50 hrs and
12
18 mins. When running SensCrypt’s RecordData operation,
the battery lasted 43 hrs and 38 mins. Thus, Fitbit’s sensor
recording operation shortens the battery by 10% over the base-
line. SensCrypt’s RecordData reduces the battery lifetime
by 13% of the Fitbit battery lifetime. Finally, when running
FitCrypt-RSA-256, the battery lasted only 22 hrs and 10 mins.
Even with a vulnerable key size, FitCrypt reduces the battery
lifetime by 49% of the SensCrypt lifetime. This confirms the
unsuitability of public key cryptosystems to secure resource
constrained fitness trackers.
IX. RELATED WORK
In the context of implantable medical devices (IMDs)
Halperin et al. [10] introduce novel software radio attacks
and propose zero power notification, authentication and key
exchange solutions. Rasmussen et al. [12] propose proximity
based access control solutions for IMDs. The different mission
of fitness trackers creates different design constraints. First,
unlike IMD security, where the focus is on authentication and
key exchange, SensCrypt’s focus is on the secure storage and
communication of tracker data. This is further emphasized by
our need to also consider attackers that can perform Capture
and JTAG-R attacks, for both trackers and bases (readers in
the IMD context). While such attacks may not be possible for
IMDs, and IMD readers may be expensive enough to afford
tamper proof memory, these assumptions do not hold for most
existing fitness centric social sensor network solutions. Fur-
thermore, while additional user interaction may be naturally
accepted for IMDs, fitness security solutions should minimize
or even eliminate user involvement.
Tsubouchi et al. [9] have shown that Fitbit data can be used
to infer surprising information, in the form of working rela-
tions between tracker carrying co-workers. This information
could be used to surreptitiously learn the organizational profile
of a company. This work assumes access to the fitness data of
other users, a task that part of our paper undertakes.
Naveed et al. [13] introduced an “external device mis-
bonding attack” for Bluetooth enabled Android health/medical
devices, then collected sensitive user data from and fed ar-
bitrary information into the user’s account. They developed
Dabinder, an OS level defense that generates and enforces
secure bonding policies between a device and its official app.
Our work differs in the types and implementation of attacks,
and in the solution placement: SensCrypt is implemented at
the tracker and webserver, whereas Dabinder is focused on the
base.
Lim et al. [36] analyzed the security of a remote cardiac
monitoring system where the data originating from the sensors
is sent through a Body Area Network (BAN) gateway and a
wireless router to a final monitoring server. Muraleedharan
et al. [37] proposed DoS attacks including Sybil [38] and
wormhole [39] attacks, for a health monitoring system using
wireless sensor networks. They introduced an energy-efficient
cognitive routing algorithm to address such attacks. Our work
differs through its system architecture, communication model
and tracker capabilities.
Barnickel et al. [40] targeted security and privacy issues for
HealthNet, a health monitoring and recording system. They
proposed a security and privacy aware architecture, relying
on data avoidance, data minimization, decentralized storage,
and the use of cryptography. Marti et al. [41] described the
requirements and implementation of the security mechanisms
for MobiHealth, a wireless mobile health care system. Mo-
biHealth relies on Bluetooth and ZigBee link layer security
for communication to the sensors and uses HTTPS mutual
authentication and encryption for connections to the backend.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We identified and exploited vulnerabilities in the design of
Fitbit and Garmin, to launch inspection and injection attacks.
We presented SensCrypt, a secure and efficient solution for
storing and communicating tracker sensor data. SensCrypt
imposes minimal computation and communication overhead
on trackers, and is resilient even to attackers able to probe the
memory of captured trackers.
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